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Abstract
Many regions that are endowed with scarce natural resources such as arable land and water, and which are remote
from a central government, suffer from violence and ethnic strife. A number of studies have looked at the conver-
gence of economic, political and ecological marginality in several African countries. However, there is limited empiri-
cal study on the role of violence in pastoral livelihoods across ecological and geographical locations. Yet, case studies
focusing on livelihood and poverty issues could inform us about violent behaviour as collective action or as individual
decisions, and to what extent such decisions are informed or explained by specific climatic conditions. Several case
studies point out that violence is indeed an enacted behaviour, rooted in culture and an accepted form of interaction.
This article critically discusses the relevance of geographical and climatic parameters in explaining the connection
between poverty and violent conflicts in Kenya’s pastoral areas. These issues are considered vis-a`-vis the role insti-
tutional arrangements play in preventing violent conflict over natural resources from occurring or getting out of
hand. The article uses long-term historical data, archival information and a number of fieldwork sources. The results
indicate that the context of violence does not deny its agency in explanation of conflicts, but the institutional set-up
may ultimately explain the occurrence of the resource curse.
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Natural resource wealth, climate change and
violent conflict
This article looks at the possible links between environ-
mental factors and collective behaviour. A direct causal
link between society and the physical environment has
long been dismissed as physical determinism (Cole,
1996), because there is no direct relationship between,
for instance, economic performance and the natural
resource base. Yet, others have alluded to a strong
relationship between the supply of environmental
resources and the occurrence of violent conflict
(Homer-Dixon, 1999; Kahl, 2006). These divergent
views about the connection between scarcity and conflict
indicate the complex issues that have continued to draw
out academic debate (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998;
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de Soysa, 2002; Gleditsch, 1998; Homer-Dixon, 1999).
Until now the mainstream thinking has been that
scarcity of resources creates war and conflict (Kaplan,
1994; Homer-Dixon, 1999). However, resource scar-
city might actually foster cooperation over resources
rather than trigger conflict (see also Buhaug, Gleditsch
& Theisen, 2008).
The Human Development Report 2007/2008 most
prominently emphasized the consequences of climate
change for human security (UNDP, 2007; IPCC,
2007) rather than just being an environmental issue.
Africa is termed a continent with climate-dependent eco-
nomic sectors at risk of violent ethnic conflict. Climate-
change predictions for Africa suggest increasing scarce
water resources associated with a high risk of violent
conflict, and declining and failing agricultural yields
in the Horn of Africa (Carius, 2009; OECD, 2008).
Burke et al. (2009) found correlations between changes
in temperature or high levels of variability in rainfall
and the likelihood of violent conflict events in Africa.
The question arises, therefore, whether Kenya, which
is experiencing the drying up of lakes and rivers, dwind-
ling water supplies, and serious food shortages, is facing
a typical situation with conflict induced by environ-
mental scarcity.
The changes in rainfall patterns and frequent
droughts make the survivability of pastoralists in the arid
environments particularly difficult (Boko et al., 2007).
Cyclical droughts are increasing in frequency, with the
drought cycle, on average, increasing from one in eight
years to one every three years. Interannual and intersea-
sonal variations in rainfall patterns determine pastoral
mobility and the use of fall-back grazing areas, intercom-
munity relations and altered land tenure arrangements,
and conflict to the detrimental use of the rangelands.
The availability of common-pool resources across border
areas leads to periodic conflicts in the drylands. Con-
flicts between pastoral communities in the arid border-
lands of northern Kenya, southern Sudan and southern
Ethiopia are said to be over access to pasture and water,
livestock raiding and the heavy presence of small arms
(Leff, 2009). The fighting between pastoralists and
farmers in the Oromia and Ogaden regions of Ethiopia,
and interclan fighting in Somalia all seem to indicate
the links between the human impacts of climate change
and the threats of violent conflicts (Human Impact
Report, 2009).
Lobell et al. (2008) predict a 54% increase in armed
conflicts in sub-Saharan Africa by 2030 compared to the
1980 to 2000 period, if future wars are as deadly as
recent wars. Burke et al. (2009) report strong historical
linkages between civil war and temperature increase in
Africa. These claims were later refuted by Buhaug
(2010a,b), who shows that, using a more accurate method
of investigation and by making use of a more complete
armed conflict dataset, there is no causal relationship.
The risk of increased conflict trends in Africa
are likely a result of many complex reasons, including
inadequate governance, rampant corruption, heavy
dependence on natural resources and ongoing cycles of
violent conflict (Halden, 2007; Olsson, Eklundh &
Ardo¨, 2005). Buhaug, Gleditsch & Theisen (2008) give
an overview of multiple factors that may play a role in the
evolution of climate change-related violence, yet empha-
size that there is no up-to-date empirical statistical evi-
dence of violence directly related to climate change and
environmental scarcities. Natural resources usually seem
like the obvious cause, but conflict may be triggered by
the absence of good institutions and external interfer-
ence. A study of Northern Kenya found that it is not
drought, but the coming of the rains that is associated
with greater conflict casualties (Witsenburg & Adano,
2009). Pastoralists do not fight during a time of scarcity
but during periods of plenty, and the disruption of
livelihoods remains a major concern for security poli-
cies. In combination with economic, social and political
uncertainties, climate change might increase the risks of
conflict and instability, especially under conditions of
poor governance.
The actual impacts of climate change remain
controversial and speculative. According to Ostrom
(1990) and Young (2011) natural resources, including
common-pool resources such as forests, grazing pastures
and fisheries, are at times better managed collectively.
Ostrom (1990) explains that self-governing institutions
under common property rights are able to regulate many
resources for collective benefits, as people learn to coop-
erate when presented with a resource problem. In this
regard, institutions become a decisive variable in shaping
human–environment interaction, and in preventing
competition over resources turning into a violent conflict
(Ostrom, 2007; Young, 2011). We do not argue that
resource scarcity or abundance bring about (violent) con-
flict by themselves, but aim to provide evidence of how
and under what conditions natural resources contribute
to cooperation or violent conflict. This article shows
the outcome of an enquiry into the relationship between
climate change, natural resources availability and mar-
ginality (ecological and political) and social interactions
between ethnic groups. The article seeks to answer the
question whether we can develop an approach that com-
bines the physical environment and human agency
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mediated by social institutions in explaining why natural
resources and violence are not always directly related.
The examples come from Kenya, where in the last couple
of years violent incidents attracted much attention.
This work links up with the current debate on the
demographic and social consequences of climate change
in particular by linking ethnic violence and natural
resource availability. Violent killing and raiding take
place in a social context that may be motivated by
considerations other than climate. In the first case of
northern Kenya, cooperation increases in the dry season
as natural resources become scarcer, and violence
increases during the wet season. Against this back-
ground, the issues of governance and cooperation turn
out to be relevant for our inquiry into the role of
resource scarcity in low-productivity arid areas. In the
second case of southern Kenya, the Loita forest as a con-
tested resource also turned out not to be a resource
curse1 because of the management regime and an inge-
nious use of old and new institutions that prevented the
loss of the forest to a private ‘developer’. The benefits
from the communally used forest remained well distrib-
uted among the local inhabitants.
The article draws a parallel between the conventional
notions of resource scarcity inducing violent conflict, on
the one hand, and the resource curse as it relates to abun-
dant endowments of natural resources, on the other. We
use these concepts to investigate the importance of the
local institutions in access to and use of environmental
resources. Natural resource regulations and governance
arrangements play an important role in handling poten-
tial conflicts over scarce water resources in the drylands
and in community-shared forest resources, even when
climate change seems evident. For instance, while Africa
generally is expected to get hotter and drier, climate
change will bring different changes to different areas and,
in particular, Marsabit and Loita are expected to get
more rain coupled with more variability.
Resource curse and violent conflict in poor
countries
The resource curse, or the paradox of plenty, generally
refers to the observation that countries harbouring
abundant natural resources often lag behind in their eco-
nomic performance relative to countries with limited
natural resources. The explanation of this phenomenon
varies widely across disciplines, and singling out a few
causative variables has therefore been a very difficult
exercise in a large number of studies (Brunnschweiler
& Bulte, 2009; Collier & Hoeffler, 1998; de Soysa,
2002; Sachs & Warner, 1997, 2001).
Even in wealthy, democratic countries, the ‘paradox
of plenty’ can be observed when state revenues from nat-
ural resources have paralysing effects on manufacturing
and economic productivity (see, for instance, Krugman,
1987). In countries with a low GDP per capita and slow
growth, poverty and scarcity of natural resources are
assumed to be related to violent conflict (Brunnschweiler
& Bulte, 2009). A large number of studies have been
carried out to establish whether resource depletion leads
to social unrest and eventually ethnic wars (Kaplan,
1994; Homer-Dixon, 1999). Especially in regions
where people depend on the natural environment in
production systems that rather produce for self-
sufficiency than for the market, a link between poverty
and violence is easily suggested (see Peluso & Watts,
2001 for a critical review).
The resource-curse paradigm seems to be especially
relevant to countries whose GDP largely consists of
revenues from primary commodity exports (Collier,
Hoeffler & Rohner, 2009). When governments are
unable to ensure fair distribution of returns from
resources and provide basic public goods such as security,
education and health financed through resource revenue,
resource abundance stimulates violence, grievances, theft
and looting caused by rebel groups, and even civil war
(Mehlum, Moene & Torvik, 2006). Different economic
growth rates among resource-rich countries are primarily
explained by how resource revenues are distributed via the
institutional arrangement and fair systems of democratic
governance. Their study confirms that when individuals
‘colonize’ the opportunities of power and resource profit
offered by the state to influential leaders or politicians,
natural resources push the aggregate incomes down when
institutions are ‘grabber-friendly’. This means that a large
share of revenues earned from natural resources end up
benefiting only a few individuals at the expense of the gen-
eral public, usually the poor. This hints at the importance
of governance and institutions in regulating the use of rev-
enues accruing from natural resources at the national level.
In the following sections we present two case studies that
indicate that resource conflicts can be settled when insti-
tutional arrangements do not always lead to unlimited
resource grabbing. This assumed link between scarcity
1 Popularly, resource curse refers to a phenomenon where countries,
regions or areas with an abundance of natural resources tend to show
less economic growth and worse development outcomes than
countries with fewer natural resources (Collier & Hoeffler, 1998;
Sachs & Warner, 2001). In this article it refers to a situation where
resource-rich areas show a high chance of (violent) conflicts.
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of natural resources and conflict is tested and falsified in
the first case study from northern Kenya, and the other
from southern Kenya (Figure 1).
In the northern Kenya drylands, where livestock raid-
ing is a widespread practice among pastoralists, the use of
violence is common and part of the group-specific
Figure 1. Location of Marsabit and Narok Districts in Kenya
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accepted codes of conduct and cultural institutions.
Yet during times of drought, warring parties patch up
their differences and reconcile to use scarce water
resources together from limited water holes. While water
is generally scarce in drylands, water abundance is
extremely localized in northern Kenya, like in the other
drylands. Thus, the ‘value’ of water as a resource in those
few places increases.
The second case study deals with the paradox of
plenty in a different way. In southern Kenya, pastoralists
had a conflict over forest management and accessibility.
Using a mix of indigenous and formal institutions, sub-
sections of Maasai pastoralists were able to secure their
access rights through a largely nonviolent settlement in
court, whereby the individual resource grabbers had to
withdraw their case to allow local communities to share
the forest and its associated benefits according to the
terms of local institutions governing natural resources.
The Maasai case brings to light a pluralistic (i.e. use of
traditional and ‘official’) form of resource regulation and
access rights through collective organization of the Maa-
sai subgroups. These groups make ingenious use of
common-pool resource institutions and the provisions
of the legal courts to peacefully settle differences over
common property resources, despite increasing pressure
on these resources due to changing climatic conditions.
This result links up with other studies (Ostrom, 1990;
Anderies, Janssen & Ostrom, 2004) that find the role
of local institutions crucial to resource management,
avoiding a potential resource curse and instead turning
it into a blessing. Thus, the example from northern
Kenya is about the environmental context and the use
of the institutional structures (raiding as a traditional
social institution) to cope with violence. A change in
environmental context such as drought activates tradi-
tional institutional structures (coping mechanism) that
in turn mediate behaviour of raiders (social institution)
toward cooperation. The Loita case demonstrates how
non-state actors can react to social threat to a portion
of their resource base (i.e. the Loita Forest as a dry season
fall-back area for Maasai herders in the lowlands) in
order to protect their interest without violence. While
the Marsabit case is mainly about the use and outcome
of social institutions of raiding, the Maasai case is about
particular social institutions of age groups, Laibon and
the local NGO. Both case studies show that valuable nat-
ural resources are protected and shared through peaceful
collective action during periods of stress (drought, or
resource capture by the state) rather through violent
action. People are probably more inclined to cooperate
and share resources when wealth benefits them all.
Example of violent conflict from northern
Kenya2
Northern Kenya is an economically poor and marginal
region, where water, arable land and pasture are scarce
resources. Their availability is highly variable, but
nevertheless of vital importance to the local population.
Most people here such as the Borana, Rendille, Gabra,
Samburu and Dassanetch are pastoralists who fully
depend on the environmental resources for their survival.
Low and unreliable, rainfall determines the availability of
water, pasture, crop yields and livestock production
including milk and meat. Dry months typically cause
stress, because all the resources that people depend on
become scarcer. When the pressure on resources
increases, it seems more likely that people will fight over
access to these resources. Northern Kenya therefore pro-
vides a test case of climatic variability and social
responses (Adano &Witsenburg, 2004). In this context,
research has been carried out on the availability of water
resources and violent conflicts over several years to inves-
tigate whether there is a link between water scarcity and
violence. We examined the number of violent deaths in
dry and wet years in Marsabit District (including
Moyale) over more than 30 years, using archival records
and annual reports of government ministries. There was
no evidence that drought years were more violent than
wet years (Figure 2). On the contrary, there was more
violence in years of high rainfall. Twice as many people
(50 vs. 23) were killed in wet years as in drought years.3
We could think of a situation in which people might
postpone violence until the first wet year after a drought
year. But wet or average years following a drought did
not show more conflict incidents and killings. In fact,
fewer people were killed in wet years following droughts
than in wet years in general, although the standard devia-
tion is so high that the difference is not significant. The
violence occurring in Marsabit District cannot be attrib-
uted to drought-induced scarcity of resources (Adano &
Witsenburg, 2008).
Another set of data from the same areas on seasonal-
ity and the number of killings shows yearly seasonal
fluctuations in the type of violence and the number
2 This section draws heavily on work in Northern Kenya, as described
in Adano & Witsenburg (2004, 2008) and Witsenburg & Adano
(2007, 2009).
3 A ‘drought year’ is defined as a year when the annual rainfall is 700
mm or less. The rainfall was measured on Marsabit Mountain, which
receives a higher amount of rainfall than the surrounding lowlands
(Adano & Witsenburg, 2008: 229, 1161–66).
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of killings. Figure 3 shows the relationships between
seasonal human killings and rainfall patterns based on
information from archival records of the Security
Committee. We only took years for which we had 12
months of both rainfall data and the number of killings.
We divided the year into four seasons based on a bimo-
dal rainfall pattern (long rain March–May and short
rain October–December), with two dry seasons, in
northern Kenya. Figure 3 also shows the sum of all
people killed and those killed in raids, per month, com-
bined in three-month seasons. The data only include
interethnic violence. Intragroup killings are excluded
from these figures because data are not available from
the records.
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In January–March relatively few people are killed in
raids. The number of violent raids shoots up in the wet
season of April–June, but then decreases during the dry
period in July–September. Raid-related violence again
goes up in the wet season of October–December.
Generally, most violent killings in this region occur dur-
ing livestock raids. Only one person per month on aver-
age is killed in other fights. This figure remains stable
over the year, except for the dry season of July–September
when other violent killings shoot up. During the
July–September season there still is a very high murder
rate that is not livestock-related. A closer look reveals that
these months were particularly violent in the years 1963
(46 killings), 1992 (24 killings) and 1994 (49 killings).
In 1963, Kenya achieved independence and the secessio-
nist Shifta War started, so this was a very violent year in
the whole of the northern region. 1992, when multi-
party democracy was introduced, was a very violent year
all over the country. In 1994, there was a violent ethnic
conflict on Marsabit Mountain between the Borana
and the Burji. These incidents were solely politically
motivated confrontations.
Violence as enacted individual behaviour and collective
choice
The finding that more people are killed in raids during
the wet season may seem strange to outside observers,
but to the local people involved it was simply explained
by their notion of rational behaviour. In northern Kenya
people do not necessarily engage in violent conflict in
general, and more specifically not over water resources.
Especially during droughts people are more inclined to
keep the peace, to cooperate and to use wells together.
Even though wells can be individually owned or owned
by a specific clan, the water inside is a common property
resource and carefully managed by a number of people.
When a drought is expected, warring pastoralists usually
reconcile in order to use water and pasture together.
Violent livestock raiding is mostly carried out during the
wet season. The animals are stronger and fatter then, and
the vegetation and surface water are more readily avail-
able, which is necessary during a long trek away from the
area where the raid took place. The vegetation is also
thicker, which makes it easier to hide after an attack.
Raiders usually have to trek long distances, for which the
animals should be fit and strong. Raiding is especially
common during the rainy season because rain washes
away tracks, which increases the chance of escaping with
the raided livestock. Rainy seasons in pastoral areas are
usually times of relative abundance, not only of pasture,
water or milk. There is also a labour surplus, which
makes it easy for young men to engage in raiding.
As Peristiany (1939) notes in the 1930s for the
Kipsigis, raids are carried out under enduring hardship
in the bush and using every tactic of enemy engagement
such as sending out spies, occupying all the strategic
positions to ward off any forthcoming help for those
attacked and attack before daybreak. In 2008, one infor-
mant narrated how raids are normally organized. The
people who participate in the raid come from all clans
to avoid the risk that one clan is decimated when the
attack fails. Most age groups are also represented. Raiders
who are too eager to attack because of anxiety and lack of
sleep might be advised not to join the group at the place
of the enemy on the actual day of attack. The party needs
some calm and experienced men who do not make dis-
astrous errors during the attack. Before the actual raiding
day, the group decides which animals to take and also
obtain tags such as white bark of a tree to differentiate
themselves from the enemies (Wosori Damballa,4
Marsabit, July 2008). Otherwise the group may end
up killing each other in the commotion, especially in the
dark when it is difficult to differentiate people.
The same informant stated that such big raids are rare
nowadays, as Peristiany (1939) also observed in the
1930s among the Kipsigis community in western Kenya.
According to the informant it is hard for such a large
group of men to leave the herds for so long a period.
In times of hardship such as dry seasons or during
droughts there is no labour surplus as heavy manpower
is required by the herding families. This narrative clearly
confirms the notion of both individual or collective
action in violence as rational behaviour, and the phe-
nomenon of cooperation to overcome climatic stress
rather than to indulgence in violent behaviour.
A number of other interesting descriptions explain the
practice of violent livestock raiding in a similar way. For
example, Mieth (2006), Eaton (2008) and de Vries
(2007) have independently surveyed cattle raiders in the
western Pokot area for their motives and raiding prac-
tices and their perceptions of insecurity. Like-minded
small groups organize raids of which the whole ethnic
group is not necessarily always informed (Peristiany,
1939; Almagor, 1979). Approval of elders was often not
sought. A raid should therefore not simply be called
‘ethnic warfare’ or ‘ethnic clash’, since it is not the ethnic
group as a whole or its leaders that is involved in
4 The names have been changed in order to maintain the anonymity
of the interview participant.
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violence. In addition, raiding parties consist of a small
selection of warriors who strive to achieve social standing
in the pastoral society. They are often young, strong and
certainly not among the poorest. They value group
respect, bravery and earning a name among peer groups,
and defend or protect their own group’s territorial graz-
ing areas. To be seen as a hero, and gaining the image of a
fierce cattle raider, is of immense importance to the war-
riors. According to Pokot informants (Mieth, 2006) a
raider goes to the war front for appreciation of others,
to prove he is a hero and to earn praise for killing an
enemy. A warrior who proves to have poor raiding skills
is teased without mercy. A raider who goes to raid and
then runs away from the raided party is called a coward
and people will compose and sing songs to humiliate him
and his family.
In Pokot, like in other drylands, situations of insecur-
ity and keeping a region unsafe serve the raiders well.
The raiders do not necessarily have the same interests
as those who prefer a secure environment and a peaceful
community. Raiding is training for survival in insecure
areas. Understandably, finding a partner who is able to
face up to a fight is a matter of securing the basic survival
for girls. Indeed, spaces of insecurity have for a long time
served such communities in their struggle against gov-
ernment control, as the following incident from the colo-
nial records shows. The colonial administrator from
1963 in northern Kenya describes an incident on the
15 June, when a 35-strong raiding party attacked a
Samburu hamlet and killed and mutilated about 24
people. Only two raiders were wounded during the
attack, and the rest looted and made off with all the cat-
tle owned by the village. One policeman killed two of
the attackers later, but the remainder of the raiders
made off. This raided hamlet was situated in the
extreme south-west of Marsabit District, in country dif-
ficult to access. Only 24 hours later news of the incident
reached Loiyangalani, so that Kenya Police and Tribal
Police could be deployed in an attempt to intercept and
trace the offenders.5
This incident depicts the livestock raiding practice as
something of a ritual to humiliate and dehumanize the
enemy. The raid described here took place in a very
remote area, which was not only difficult to access but
also made it difficult for the police to intervene. This is
a typical geographical feature necessary for a successful
raid. The raiding party consisted of at least 35 men,
which is partly indicative of a collective action that needs
organization and mobilization. The raiding party only
lost two members to the police while the rest made off
with their loot. The advantage of raiders over the police
is that they know the landscape better and are usually
better trained in trekking through rough country. The
brutality of the attack, during which not only were live-
stock taken but the bodies of men, women and children
alike were mutilated is a reminder that this event is not
only about resource capture. The year 1963 (with
1,235 mm rainfall) was not a dry year, and the 1960s
were not a period of drought (Adano & Witsenburg,
2004: 91); it was even one of the wettest decades in the
history of recorded rainfall in the district.
On insecurity, poverty and geographical context
The number of people who were killed in interethnic
violence in Marsabit and Moyale comes to an average
of about 25 persons per 100,000 inhabitants per year
from 1949 to 1959 (KHRC, 2000; Witsenburg &
Adano, 2009) and 36 persons per 100,000 inhabitants
each year from 2002 to 2008. The increase could be a
result of a more efficient method of counting and report-
ing, and also worsening tension between ethnic groups
related to the government’s ardent top-down approach
to the introduction of new boundaries. New administra-
tive boundaries have cut off former natural resources for
neighbouring ethnic groups, in regions where resources
were shared before. With this high killing rate, the region
comes close to being as insecure as urbanized areas in the
world, such as Nairobi (77), Washington, DC (60), or
Pretoria (43).6
Dryland regions generally bear the image of being
unsafe. It is not a coincidence that geography and social
problems converge here; remote and marginal areas are
attractive environments for certain types of violence and
criminal behaviour. This is in line with Fleisher (2000),
who observed that in southern Kenya no effective oppo-
sition to cattle raiding exists among herding commu-
nities because of recurring clan warfare. While alluding
to a similar ethnographic account in western Kenya,
Anderson (1993: 865) observes that among the Kalenjin
community, allegedly, the cattle-rustling activities of the
moran (a Maasai word for warriors) are considered
rather a ‘sport’ and not a crime. This kind of view
locally legitimizes the practice of cattle raiding and
5 Marsabit District Security Committee (DSC) Files; C. Sec. 2/1/5/
IV/494 (1963: 2).
6 1997 figures (Barclay & Tavares, 2002). The Marsabit figures are
underreported, because these only include violent deaths as a result
of interethnic fights or raids (Gimode, 2001).
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functions as a training opportunity for young men to
try out and perfect their raiding, and thus thieving
skills. The culturally endorsed and socially rewarded
raiding behaviour thus reinforces a climate of insecurity
and lawlessness that is necessary to raid effectively,
especially against certain groups in the absence of effec-
tive law enforcement. Thus it proves true that ‘War is
good for thieving’ (Fleisher, 2000: 750) or that ‘oppor-
tunity makes the thief’ (Felson & Clarke, 1998).
Ingenuity in social institutions
The conflict in the Loita Maasai area of Narok District,
southern Kenya, is a very illuminating one for our argu-
ment. The contested resource is the Loita Naimina
Enkiyio Forest (LNEF or Loita forest hereafter), a source
of water, dry-season grazing area and natural forest on
the edge of the Great Rift Valley. The forest is used by
the Loita Maasai, but coveted by the Purko Maasai, liv-
ing to the north but still inside Narok District. In many
similar cases in Kenya over the last few decades, ethnic
groups or subethnic groups compete or sometimes fight
over key resources for access, use of revenues or compet-
ing claims over ownership rights. Water resources and
dry-season grazing in pastoral areas are the natural capitals
triggering conflict when issues of access, usage rights and
ownership are at stake. The Loita forest can be seen as a
scarce resource, for which ethnic groups compete.
However, due to its character, size and fixed location, and
given the context of the Kenyan economy and political
constellation, the Loita forest is also a resource for national
actors. Not only the ethnic groups, but also their ministers
want access for personal wealth. These two conflicts
merge, and we describe the process chronologically.
The context is typical for Kenya and many other
countries in Africa. The Kenyan population has
increased rapidly, from 10.9 million people in 1969 to
38.6 million in 2009 (KNBS, 2010) and shows no sign
of stabilizing soon. In Narok District, population growth
has been even more rapid, with about a seven-fold
increase over the same period. Already among the most
densely populated semi-arid areas of Kenya, the pressure
on land in Narok District has increased further with
commercial wheat production taking large tracts of land
away from use by pastoral producers.
In addition, climate change seems to have begun
impacting this region too, and long-term rainfall
figures show a decline in the western part of Kenya since
the early 1970s, which is supported by (still scanty) data
on precipitation in Narok and nearby Kajiado Districts.
Droughts have become lengthier, the rainfall within the
rainy season more variable. Figure 4 shows a clear increase
in rainfall particularly in recent years in Narok District,
but as this seems to coincide with higher temperatures and
subsequent higher evapo-transpiration, the effect is a
decline in the moisture balance.
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Figure 4. Rainfall trend for Narok, south western Kenya
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The Loita forest is a fall-back area for the Loita
Maasai and the neighbouring Purko alike and is there-
fore increasingly important for the survival of the pas-
toral production system. As a consequence, there is a
slow migratory movement towards the forest, and the
potential for conflict over future access rises. Although
the previous case can be characterized as a study of
short-term conflicts over seasonally scarce resources,
this case provides a longer-term perspective on scarcity
due to population growth, climate change and relative
resource scarcity.
The Loita forest is set between the Nguruman-Magadi
escarpment bordering Kajiado District to the east, the
Osupuko Oirobi (Purko Maasai land) to the north, the
border of Tanzania to the south and the rangelands
towards the Maasai Mara National Game Reserve, the
most famous tourist destination in Kenya, to the west.
The Loita Maasai area encompasses a variety of ecosys-
tems, of which the grasslands at lower altitudes and the
Loita forest at higher altitudes form the dominant fea-
tures. The forest is one of the few un-gazetted (i.e. with
no legal restrictions of local access) and largely undis-
turbed indigenous forests in Kenya (Njogu, 2004).
The Loita Hills, with the Loita forest, are the main
water catchments for the surrounding lowlands. The
forested highlands receive, on average, an annual rain-
fall of between 700 and 1,200 mm, while rainfall in the
surrounding lower rangelands is at 600–700 mm. The
wetland areas and, during extreme droughts, the up-
land semi-deciduous and mixed species forests form
the ultimate fall-back grazing areas (Maundu et al.,
2001; Dietz, 1996). During the extreme drought of
2005–06, almost all Loita Maasai herds were grazed
within the forest.
The Loita Maasai community has an indigenous
tenure system that gives use rights of natural resources
to various groups in and outside the community. The
Loita forest is a common-pool resource shared by many
users for grazing, traditional cultural ceremonies, medic-
inal plants, construction materials and as a source of
water. Certain resource types and uses are strictly con-
trolled, while others are more freely accessible. For exam-
ple, the forest has considerable spiritual and emotional
value. Many transition rites and other important rituals
and ceremonies take place in the forest, such as the
age-set initiation and cleansing rituals and fertility bles-
sings for women who are unable to give birth (Maundu
et al., 2001). Because of all these usage practices, the Loita
community sees the spiritual leader, the Laibon, who per-
forms his ritual duties at specific sacred sites in the forest,
as the custodian of the forest. He is central to forest
conservation. The Laibonok (plural of Laibon) have
unlimited rights and access to the forest to provide divine
services to the wider Maasai society rather than for their
own private gains (Karanja, Tessema & Barrow, 2002).
The Loita community shares the grazing land with
the neighbouring Purko Maasai community and the
Loita Maasai of Tanzania. As long as the boundaries
of the territories are undisputed and resource use is
mediated and regulated by customary laws, the sharing
of seasonal pastures by the different Maasai sections
poses no threat to any section. It is a reciprocal right
used during emergencies and regulated by customary
laws. In this case and depending on the season, the
Laibonok and the herders have overlapping rights to use
the forest, for cultural ceremonies and grazing, respec-
tively (Ole Siloma & Zaal, 2005).
However, there has been a slow and continuous
migration of Purko Maasai towards the Loita highlands
for many decades now, starting early in the colonial
period as part of early 20th-century upheavals.7 The
Purko population, being more numerous and living in
slightly drier areas of Narok, had for some time been
invading the forest and Loita area. The valleys leading
into the forest were, and still are, slowly being occupied
by Purko Maasai. This slow intrusion into Loita Maasai
ancestral lands and into the forest is resented by the Loita
Maasai who are frequently in conflict with the Purko
migrants over illegal use of the forest, such as charcoal
burning and timber production. The relationship
between these two groups has been ‘not cordial’, to quote
an interviewee. Yet, the Purko Maasai who live in those
valleys maintain that as long-time residents they have the
right to use the forest, especially when they claim access
on the basis of belonging to similar clans that exist within
both the Loita and Purko Maasai communities.
Collective rights versus rent-seeking behaviour over the
Loita forest
The Loita forest is located on trustland (Maundu et al.,
2001), which means it is entrusted to the local County
Council of Narok and managed in accordance with the
Trust Land Act (Cap. 288 of the Laws of Kenya). The
7 The pressure on the grazing resources in Narok and Kajiado
Districts had increased considerably due to the displacement in two
successive moves of the Maasai community from the Central
Kenya Highlands such as Laikipia, when white ranchers, supported
by the colonial government, appropriated these areas. Within a
decade, the population in Narok and Kajiado Districts almost
doubled.
74 journal of PEACE RESEARCH 49(1)
 at Universiteit van Amsterdam SAGE on February 8, 2012jpr.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
potential of the forest as a conservation area and tourist
site has been a source of conflict among the different
interest groups, notably the local community and the
County Council. The local balance of power was fur-
ther complicated when one of the most prominent
leaders of the Purko Maasai, a minister in the Kenyan
Cabinet, tried to generate support among local elected
leaders (councillors of the Divisions of Narok District
of which Loita Division is only one) to gazette the for-
est (i.e. restrict local access) and turn it into a forest
reserve and national park. This would have expelled
the present local users from the forest and would have
allowed a few entrepreneurs to build lodges and gener-
ate private revenues from tourism. The Minister had a
number of lodges in the neighbouring Maasai Mara
District, and thus he clearly had the business experi-
ence and opportunity to take over the forest and build
tourist facilities there.
The Purko minister had allied himself with a Loita
Member of Parliament and a Loita councillor. The three
men seemed to have agreed that the Loita forest was to be
demarcated for gazettement, and the councillor drafted a
letter incorrectly writing that the Loita people agreed to
the gazettement decision. The intention to gazette the
forest was communicated to the Minister for Environ-
ment.8 This minister himself had benefited from a similar
procedure, when a neighbouring group ranch had been
demarcated and leased to him when he was still a Member
of Parliament for a neighbouring constituency.
However, resistance began to build up, and the direc-
tor of a regional development project, the Ilkerin Loita
Integrated Development Project (ILIDP),9 called a
meeting of the Loita Council of Elders (LCE). The LCE
had been installed earlier with assistance from the ILIDP
project to organize the community. The LCE was consti-
tuted with the intention to have a broad representation
of the population in the council. An important part of
the intervention strategy of the ILIDP, this participation
did ultimately lead to more relevant project work. Now,
however, it also linked the population that started to
resist the gazettement with the ILIDP, the senior elders,
the elected councillors, the Laibonok, the development
officers in the government, and some women and youth
groups. Some of the LCE members were also on the
Board of ILIDP, for example. The Narok County Coun-
cil (NCC) was acknowledged at the time as being
entirely justified in managing the forest and deciding
on its future use, as the council kept all un-demarcated
and un-gazetted land in trust for the benefit of the local
population. Even so, the earlier loss of access to the
Maasai Mara and Kamororo group ranch referred to
above (Zaal & Ole Siloma, 2006), which was previously
allowed by earlier council members and had benefited
the Minister for the Environment, had made the ILIDP
and LCE very concerned. Other similar cases included
the destruction in previous years of the Mau forest,
which is also a Narok forest area under NCC trusteeship.
The LCE resolved to organize a broad resistance
movement. The Minister for Environment subsequently
changed his mind and agreed to assist the Loita commu-
nity. A lawyer established the Loita Naimina Enkiyio
Conservation Trust (LNECT), a registered entity with
the primary duty to protect and manage the forest and
its associated ecosystem heritage held in trust by the local
Narok County Council.
Of course this merits the question whether, as a non-
legal institution informally representing the population,
the LCE was in a position to organize resistance against
a formal and lawful institution such as the Narok
County Council, which had the responsibility by law
to decide on the future of the forest.10 However, the tim-
ing of the conflict is worth considering in the context of
Kenya’s history. The first truly democratic elections were
to be organized in 1992, and at the present stage of the
conflict, the NCC could hardly be considered truly
8 This is according to Kenyan law. As stipulated in the Forests Act
(Cap. 385), a minister has among others the powers, by notice in
the Gazette, to either declare or alter the boundaries of a forest
(Government of Kenya, 1982).
9 ILIDP was started in 1968 as the initiative of a local Loita leader
and a Dutch Catholic Missionary. Support came from Dutch
Catholic development NGOs. The conflict coincided with a period
in development thinking in general, and within this organization in
particular, that promoted empowerment, advocacy and networking
as strategies for development. Two decades after it was founded,
ILIDP was confronted with the Loita forest conflict which a decade
later was successfully solved.
10 In a recent landmark ruling, the African Commission found the
Kenyan Government guilty of violating the rights of the Endorois
community living around Lake Bogoria by unlawfully evicting
them from their ancestral land in order to create a protected area
(CMRD, 2010). Two of the views of the African Commission in
support of the ruling have relevance to the Loita example. First, the
recognition that the state has a duty to ensure that indigenous
sacred places, linked to cultural beliefs and practices, and
ceremonial acts that are central to freedom of religion, be
preserved, respected and protected. Second, the State is to apply
international law concerning the protection of indigenous people’s
collective rights to lands and natural resources as a community,
even in the absence of official title deeds to a particular territory.
These aspects would support the Maasai community in defending
their ownership rights to the local resources.
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democratic in a representative and multi-party democratic
meaning of the word. The conflict had erupted mean-
while, and protesters and those who wanted to appropriate
the forest confronted each other violently. On one occa-
sion opposite the ILIDP facilities in Narok Town, some
people were killed when police started shooting prema-
turely (Dietz, 1996).
The Loita Naimina Enkiyio Conservation Trust
(LNECT) took the matter of the appropriation of the
forest to court. In this court case, many found it very dif-
ficult to choose sides. Conflicting points of view became
apparent within the Loita community (groups were
divided along clan lines according to their Purko or Loita
background, and old and young also often disagreed).
So far, traditional institutions (age groups, Laibonok)
and modern organizations (the ILIDP, LCE and
LNECT) had joined forces to fight against the Purko
and their Minister for control over the Loita forest. The
national elections gave the opportunity for both factions
to present their views and drum up support. Within the
Loita community, councillors supported by the ILIDP
faction were better positioned to win this election. One
item that came up for public scrutiny was the letter that
the Loita councillor had written stating that the Loita
people were supportive of the gazettement. This and
many other issues ultimately led to the political demise
of the councillor who lost the election. A new Loita
councillor took charge, split his constituency11 and had
four other Loita councillors elected. This considerably
increased the representation of Loitans on the Narok
County Council, and when a Loitan was elected as chair-
man of the NCC, the political clout of the Loita commu-
nity in the NCC had improved. The power balance had
shifted between the national elections of 1992 and the
last years of the 1990s. The earlier councillor and the
minister lost control in Narok District. On the instiga-
tion of the new Loita councillors and the chairman of the
NCC, the case was withdrawn from court. The Loita for-
est did not gain the status of national park, but remained
open for use by the Loita community. A decade-long
conflict had ended.
The Loita forest case shows that individual actors can
be quite influential in how conflicts start and develop,
but the actual course that conflicts take and play out is
ultimately determined by larger forces. The underlying
tension between Purko and Loita Maasai, dating back
to well before the colonial period but strengthened by
colonial policies of population displacement and bound-
ary establishment of the Districts in which they lived,
proved to be a fertile ground both for Purko players to
gain control and for Loita players to resist this usurpa-
tion. More modern sets of legal entities, both elected
and non-elected, have been added to this sphere of con-
flict. The present status quo could not have been
reached without a modern judicial institution, used
successfully by the Loita Maasai through legally authen-
tic institutions such as development projects and a
re-established informal Council of Elders. This fasci-
nating case shows that old ethnic and subethnic con-
flicts between Maasai groups over a key resource can
be peacefully contained through complex and unex-
pected alliances.
The Loita forest case shows that with increasing pres-
sure on resources due to population growth and drought
impacts of climate change, there are opportunities for
moderation of potential conflicts. This evidence offers
an important starting point for recognizing the impor-
tance of local knowledge and norms in crafting coopera-
tive, nonviolent solutions in collective actions. This case
also shows that old institutional arrangements can link
up with new institutions and organizations to achieve this
moderation. Within a changing and interconnected
world, new threats in the form of commercial interests
arise. To counter this, new local-level alliances are formed
to deal with potential conflict over a common-pool
resource, turning resource abundance into a blessing.
Spaces of violence
Violence itself creates a space of insecurity and lawless-
ness. It attracts individuals who thrive in insecure envir-
onments where there is little or no effective state control
(Schlee, 2002, 2008; Salih, 1999). Insecurity also prevents
the entry of peaceful individuals, firms and organizations
to settle or invest locally. In addition, flows of people,
goods, information, money and weapons involved in vio-
lence either directly or indirectly are generated. Insecurity
transcends the region and makes situations conducive for
thieving and other predatory forms of involvement of out-
siders (Felson & Clarke, 1998).
Borders play a role in this process. In a raid, tracing
raided livestock is more difficult once it has crossed a
border. In a globalized world, rebel or guerrilla move-
ments with international support networks look for spar-
sely populated areas for their training camps and their
trekking routes. They also provide recruitment grounds
for unemployed youths whose bravery and courage can
11 This was implemented after discussions with the relevant
authorities in Kenya at national level. Support was sought from the
Office of the President which influenced this decision.
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be exploited and cultivated in places far from the centre.
In addition, violence and insecurity reduce people’s
capacity to cope with drought, to educate their children
properly, to market their goods and to use land inten-
sively and effectively. As a result, insecurity and violence
deny components of economic and other forms of
development and the opportunity to respond to peoples’
needs, thus preserving the state of poverty. Insecurity
and conflict in drylands have hampered provision of and
access to basic public services such as health care and
education. In the words of Sen (1999), these issues
obstruct the development of people’s capabilities. The
negative economic consequences therefore have wider
spillover effects, and the relationship between violence
and poverty centred on exactly these issues. It is not that
poor people are more likely to use violence. But, a situ-
ation of insecurity denies new and innovative ideas the
chance to develop, which in turn leads to loss of oppor-
tunities for economic growth.
A study of violent relationships between growing
numbers of humans and their struggle for access to nat-
ural resources influenced by climate change should not a
priori have a structural or an agency approach. A struc-
tural approach tends to ignore all the personal decisions
and the opportunistic behaviour of individual actors,
while an agency approach does not take pathway-
dependent structural variables into account. As the case
studies described above clearly show, there is a need to
combine both aspects.
Our conclusion is that the wetter the season, the more
people are likely to die in violent livestock raiding. In
other words, more conflicts and killings take place in wet
season times of relative abundance, and less in dry season
times of relative scarcity, when people reconcile their dif-
ferences and cooperate. During drought periods, pastor-
alists in northern Kenya deploy social institutions that
mediate agency toward cooperation and guarantee access
rights to resources (water) for all, thereby reducing vio-
lent conflicts. Remoteness and inaccessibility of the ter-
rain weaken government initiatives to provide adequate
security, but local arrangements moderate conflicts when
scarcity peaks. The absence of overt violent conflict in
Marsabit is clearly not due to lack of scarcity, which is
a common feature of marginal and deteriorating environ-
mental conditions.
In the Loita forest case, a fast-growing pastoral popu-
lation mobilized against neighbouring ethnic groups
with high-level linkages to the national government in
order to secure access to a typical common property
resource that was of vital importance to their livelihood.
Individual and group actors made clever use of
institutions to win a conflict over resources nonviolently.
The Loita forest did not become a resource curse,
because a mixture of old and new institutional arrange-
ments prevented it from being grabbed by a collusion
of competing pastoralists and a few rent-seekers. The
range of benefits from the forest’s functions and financial
revenues are now used and shared by a large number of
producers. The results reveal a rare insight into the impor-
tance of hybrid customary-cum-legal institutions and
ingenuity as to whether or not a common-pool resource
becomes a curse. Therefore, human agency ultimately
determines whether natural resources turn into a curse,
but we need the historical contextual analysis of institu-
tional structures to inform us about the potential threats
and opportunities. Equally, in a scenario of climate change
when the potential threats to the environment are known,
coping largely depends on the institutional devices
invoked by local actors. When northern Kenya indeed
receives more rain in the coming century, as predicted
by the IPCC report, we may expect more violence in the
short term. However, we may also expect the technologi-
cal and institutional change and flourishing ingenuity that
usually ensue from higher population numbers and
increased scarcity. When south-western Kenya indeed
becomes dryer, we may expect increased competition
for forest resources. Yet, institutional development may
address the need for conflict resolution. Inaccessibility,
remoteness and marginality may be reduced under such
a scenario, and this will make the environment a less
attractive place for violent behaviour.
From each of the two case studies emerges the
significant role of institutions, be they traditional or
‘official’, in preventing avoidable conflicts and allowing
reconciliatory situations to prevail within competing inter-
est groups and between rivalry communities in Loita and
Marsabit. The turning of natural resources into either a
blessing or a curse depends on the community shaping and
using its own institutional apparatus, and doing this within
its historic institutional context. Thus, in areas where cer-
tain key resources are either scarce or abundant and climate
is changing, the local institutional arrangements can be
instrumental in moderating resource-related conflicts.
Replication data
The dataset and do-files for the empirical analysis in this
article can be found at http://www.prio.no/jpr/datasets.
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